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CIVIL PROCEDURE
By WiLIAM S. COOPER*
INTRODUCTION
There probably is no area of the law which receives less
before-the-fact research than the area of civil procedure. The
late Commissioner Watson Clay, universally recognized as
Kentucky's foremost authority on civil procedure, remarked,
"It is a sad reflection upon our profession when we consider
that the loss of a law suit may sometimes be attributed in a
substantial degree to the failure of the lawyer to know, under-
stand, and comply with the rules of procedure."1 That was in
1959. Now, as we enter the era of greater public awareness of
legal malpractice and an era in which practicing attorneys are
less hesitant to file suits against their negligent brethren, the
time has come when the loss of a case on a mere technicality
may be only the beginning of the litigation. It is one thing for
a jury to find against your client on the merits and quite an-
other to be dismissed on procedural grounds.
The decisions discussed in this article include both pub-
lished and unpublished opinions of the Kentucky Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals, as well as several opinions from
federal courts interpreting Kentucky law. All involve attempts
by one of the parties to win his case on grounds having nothing
to do with the merits of his opponent's claim for relief. Sad to
report, most of these efforts were successful. Since many of
these unfortunate results involve judicial interpretation of facts
and legal theories, the fault cannot always be laid at the feet
of the lawyers. Often, it appears that the appellate court may
have stretched the facts to meet the rules and thus unnecessar-
ily denied a litigant his day in court.
The author has arranged the subject headings in the order
in which the practicing attorney might expect to encounter the
problem areas. After all, if an action is prima facie barred by
* Partner, Collier, Arnett, Coleman & Cooper, Elizabethtown, Kentucky. B.A.
1963, University of Kentucky; J.D. 1970, University of Kentucky (with high distinc-
tion). Editor-in-Chief, Kentucky Law Journal, 1969-70.
Clay, The Use and Abuse of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 Ky. L.J. 161 (1959).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
limitations, what difference does it make that the pleadings
were improperly drawn?
I. LIMITATIONS
A. Construing the Cause of Action
Powell v. The Winchester Bank2 was an action to set aside
a deed. The deed was executed while plaintiff was under a
disability, but it had been executed more than ten years prior
to the bringing of the action. An action based on fraud or mis-
take must be raised within five years after the cause of action
accrues.3 Such an action shall not be deemed to have accrued
until the fraud or mistake is discovered or should have been
discovered,4 but in no case shall such an action be commenced
after the expiration of ten years from the date the fraud or
mistake actually occurred.' In order to circumvent the ten-year
statute of limitations, the plaintiff did not even allege fraud or
mistake, but brought the case as an action for the recovery of
real property, hoping to fall under the fifteen-year limitation
prescribed by Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) § 413.013.
Plaintiff cited the case of Spicer v. Holbrook,' which is pre-
cisely on point:
This is not the ordinary equitable action brought to set aside
a deed for fraud. This is an action to cancel and declare void
a deed executed by a person of unsound mind. While it is a
fraud, of course, to obtain a deed from an infant or a person
non compos mentis, the deed of such party being void for the
want of capacity to bind them, no length of time will give
effect to that deed without a subsequent ratification, either
actual or constructive, when the disability is removed.7
In Powell, the Court construed Spicer as holding "that a
suit by one who was under disability at the time the deed was
made was predicated as a fraud upon such person."8 Thus
construing Powell as an action based on fraud, the Court ap-
2 551 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. App. 1977).
3 Ky. REv. STAT. § 413.102(12)(1972)[hereinafter cited as KRS].
I KRS § 413.130(3) (1972).
5Id.
6 66 S.W. 180 (Ky. 1902).
7 Id. at 181.
551 S.W.2d at 822.
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plied KRS § 413.120(12), the ten-year statute of limitations, as
a bar to the action. It is difficult to understand how the Court
could place such an interpretation on Spicer in view of the
paragraph quoted above, which is precisely to the contrary. In
another old case,9 Kentucky's highest court held that a suit to
supply a lost deed was by analogy an action for the recovery of
real estate, thus making applicable the fifteen-year statute of
limitations. The analogy seems equally applicable to a suit to
recover real property by setting aside a deed.
Also analogous is Hoffert v. Miller,'" which held that the
statute of limitations on a suit to set aside a deed is ten years
under KRS § 413.160, but that the statute does not begin to
run until after the plaintiff reaches the age of majority. There
is no good reason why the same rule should not apply to one
under the legal disability of unsound mind. The plaintiff in
Powell was legally restored to competency in 1967; his action
to set aside the deed was filed in 1973, which should have been
held to be well within the ten-year limitations period."
B. Accrual of the Cause of Action
In Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Louisville Trust
Co.,'" the plaintiff's decedent had been exposed during his
employment with the defendant to large quantities of asbestos-
fibre dust until the termination of his employment in October
1967. There was no exposure to the substance after that time
until his death in February 1972 from a rare type of lung cancer
associated with the inhalation of asbestos particles and dust.
His cancer was not diagnosed until August 26, 1971. The suit
was filed on August 25, 1972, on a theory of products liability.
The Court of Appeals held the action was barred by the one-
year statute of limitations,' citing Columbus Mining Co. v.
Walker. '" That case is directly in point and the court correctly
I Brandenburg v. McGuire, 44 S.W. 96 (Ky. 1898).
6 S.W. 447 (Ky. 1888).
KRS § 413.160 (1972).
-2 - S.W.2d at - (Ky. App. 1977).
, KRS § 413.140(1)(b) (Supp. 1976) requires that an action for injuries to persons,
cattle or other livestock by railroads or other corporations, with the exception of hospi-
tals licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216, be commenced within one year after the
cause of action accrued.
" 271 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
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construed its own role in the judicial framework when it noted:
"It is the function of this court to follow the decisions of the
highest court of the state and not to attempt to make new
policy by overruling those decisions."' 5
The plaintiff had argued that the court should apply the
"discovery" rule which is now applied in medical malpractice
cases, i.e., that the statute of limitations commences to run
upon discovery of the injury.'6 The court noted that as recently
as 1972, Kentucky's highest court had held in Caudill v.
Arnett'7 that the "discovery" rule was an exception to the gen-
eral rule and that its application was limited to malpractice
cases. However, in Caudill, the fact of injury was known; it was
the extent of injury that was discovered later.
The "discovery" rule has its strongest foundation in the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Urie v. Thompson. '5
In interpreting the Federal Employers' Liability Act,'9 the Su-
preme Court held the accrual of the plaintiffs cause of action
for contracting silicosis took place only when the results of the
exposure manifested themselves to him. Since that time, the
"discovery" rule has been applied in one form or another under
the laws of California,20 Connecticut,2 1' Missouri,
2 Nebraska, 2
New York, 24 Ohio,25 Oregon,21 and Pennsylvania.
2
There is no good reason why the "discovery" rule should
not be adopted in Kentucky. As previously noted, it is already
applied in medical malpractice cases. 21 It has long been a part
- S.W.2d at - (Ky. App. 1977).
Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970). See KRS § 413.140(1)(e) (Supp.
1976).
,1 481 S.W.2d 668 (Ky. 1972).
337 U.S. 163 (1949).
45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970).
21 Allred v. Bekins Wide World Van Serv., Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 312 (Cal. App.
1975); Anderson v. Southern Pac. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 743 (Cal. App. 1964).
21 Ricciuti v. Voltarc Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1960).
21 Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967).
23 Sylvania Electric Products, Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956).
24 Le Vine v. Isoserve, Inc., 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Imiola v. Erie-
Lackawanna R.R., 257 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
2 Brush Beryllium Co. v. Meckley, 284 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1960).
21 Hutchinson v. Semler, 361 P.2d 803 (Or. 1961).
27 Daniels v. Beryllium Corp., 211 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
21 Tomlinson v. Siehl, 459 S.W.2d 166 (Ky. 1970).
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of our workmen's compensation law,29 and it is applied, subject
to a ten-year limitations period, to actions based on fraud or
mistake. 0 There is also a strong analogy to be made between
the plaintiff's claim in Johns-Manville and the situation pre-
sented in Saylor v. Hall,3' in which a stone mantle and fireplace
were negligently constructed in 1955, but did not collapse and
injure the plaintiffs until 1969. It was held in that case the
cause of action did not arise until the injury occurred. This
writer sees no philosophical or policy-based distinction to be
made between a medical malpractice, workmen's compensa-
tion, fraud, or defective construction case and a case like
Johns-Manville. It is simply unjust to bar an otherwise valid
claim on grounds of limitations when there was no way the
existence of the cause of action could have been discerned by
the claimant before the period of limitations expired.
C. Tolling the Statute of Limitations
In Farris v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,32 the period of limita-
tions was to expire on November 27, 1975. One of the potential
plaintiffs had already commenced an action and on November
26, 1975, other plaintiffs filed and properly served notice that
on December 8, 1975, they would move the court to allow them
to intervene. An order allowing the intervention was subse-
quently entered on December 9, 1975. The defendants moved
to dismiss on the ground that the action (for malicious prosecu-
tion) was not commenced within one year after the cause of
action accrued.33 The federal judge conceded that the "notice"
of November 26, 1975, was not sufficient to commence an ac-
tion,34 but relied on Jack v. Travelers Insurance Co.,35 another
federal case, in overruling the motion to dismiss. The problem
is that in the Jack case, the court found that under Michigan
law, the motion to intervene was sufficient compliance with the
KRS § 342.316(3) (Supp. 1976).
KRS § 413.130(3) (1972).
" 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973).
415 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Ky. 1976).
KRS § 413.140(1)(c) (Supp. 1976) requires that actions for malicious prosecu-
tion, conspiracy, arrest, seduction, criminal conversion or breach of promise of mar-
riage be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued.
See Ky. R. Cw. P. 3.
- 22 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. Mich. 1958).
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statute of limitations. That would not suffice in Kentucky,
where only the commencement of an action will satisfy the
statute and the commencement of an action is defined as "the
filing of a complaint with the court and the issuance of a sum-
mons or warning order thereon in good faith."3 Instead, the
judge ruled in Farris that the motion to intervene tolled the
statute of limitations.
To toll the statute of limitations means to show facts
which remove its bar of the action.37 KRS Chapter 413 sets out
the exceptions which toll the statute. It is tolled by injunction
or other lawful restraint, vacancy in office, absence of an offi-
cer, or his refusal to act. If the court in which the action is
commenced rules that it has no jurisdiction of the action, the
statute is tolled for ninety days.39 The statute is tolled during
periods of disability" and during war.4" It is tolled if the plain-
tiff is confined in the penitentiary 2 or, if the plaintiff dies, then
the statute of limitations is tolled until one year after the quali-
fication of his personal representative. But nowhere do the
statutes provide that the statute of limitations is tolled by
filing a motion to intervene. The general rule is that unless
some ground can be found in the statute for restraining or
enlarging the meaning of its words, it must receive a general
construction, and the courts cannot arbitrarily subtract there-
from or add thereto.44 It is also an established rule that excep-
tions to a statute of limitations will not be implied, and if the
legislature has not seen fit to except a class of persons from the
operation of the statute, the courts will not assume the right
to do so.15 Despite all of the above, the Farris result is a just
one. The purpose of limitations statutes is to lay to rest stale
claims; this operates to the advantage of defendants. Here,
however, a suit based on the same facts was already pending
38 Ky. R. Civ. P. 3. This rule has been strictly construed. See e.g., Delong v.
Delong, 335 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1960).
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, 1658 (4th ed. 1951).
KRS § 413.260 (1972).
3, KRS § 413.270 (1972).
,0 KRS § 413.280 (1972).
41 KRS § 413.300 (1972); Seldon v. Preston, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 191 (1874).
42 KRS § 413.310 (1972).
' KRS § 413.180 (Supp. 1976).
3 51 AM. JUR.2D Limitation of Actions § 138 (1970).
3' Id. at § 139.
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against the defendant and the filing of the notice of motion to
intervene apprised the defendants of the intervenors' potential
causes of action.
H. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Three cases were decided during this term relating to serv-
ice of process on nonresident motorists.
In Begley v. Kilburn," plaintiffs served process on the sec-
retary of state alleging that the defendant was a resident of
Florida and listing a Florida address, which had been listed on
the police report. The secretary of state's registered letter to the
Florida address was returned "unclaimed." Plaintiffs obtained
a default judgment, but this was set aside on appeal because
the Florida address on the police report was followed by the
notation: "(R #2 Bybee, Ky)." The court held that the plain-
tiffs had the duty of attempting to serve the defendant at the
Kentucky address.
In Priddy v. Swimme,47 a summons was first issued to a
Louisville address, but was returned "Moved Out-Address
Unknown." An amended complaint then alleged that the de-
fendant had moved out of the state, but recited the same Louis-
ville address. The secretary of state dutifully sent a registered
letter to the Louisville address, which was returned
"Unclaimed." The subsequent default judgment was reversed
on appeal on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to pro-
vide the secretary of state with the correct address of the defen-
dant-in fact, the plaintiff had provided an address which she
knew to be incorrect.
In Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kuszynski, 48 a local summons
was returned marked "Unable to locate." Plaintiff then
amended the complaint and attempted service under the Non-
resident Motorists Act," but omitted the defendant's address
on the amended complaint. For reasons as yet unclear the sec-
retary of state sent the registered letter to the address of the
defendant's father in Louisville, an address where the defen-
dant did not reside. Not surprisingly, this attempted service
" 545 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1976).
555 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. App. 1977).
547 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1977) (mem.).
1 KRS §§ 188.010-.070 (1971).
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was also held inadequate to sustain a subsequent judgment.
The Nonresident Motorists Act does not specifically re-
quire that the secretary of state be furnished the defendant's
correct address. In fact, the statute states only that the secre-
tary of state "shall immediately mail the copy of the summons
and complaint to the defendant at the address given in the
complaint."5 However, in Hirsch v. Warren5 the then Court of
Appeals held that "the only fair and reasonable construction
of the statute is that the plaintiff must ascertain and state in
the petition the correct address of the defendant."5 In the later
case of Odley v. Wilson,'3 the Court of Appeals cited Hirsch for
the proposition that "whenever such statute is shown by the
record to be sufficiently complied with as to make it reasonably
probable that the required process was served upon defendant
as directed by the statute, it will be sufficient . . . -"I Ac-
tually, the Hirsch case says no such thing. Instead, it appears
to put a strong burden on the plaintiff to ascertain the defen-
dant's correct address, with the unassailable reasoning that if
plaintiff does not actually locate the defendant, he cannot ob-
tain, much less collect, a judgment from him. 5 What Hirsch
said about "reasonable probability" was that such a statute
was constitutional if it contained "a provision making it rea-
sonably probable that the notice will be communicated to the
person sued."'" The significance of this expansion of Hirsch in
the Odley case is that the Court in Odley implied that the
"correct address" requirement might be satisfied by a state-
ment as to the "last known address.'
57
Kentucky's Supreme Court stated in Begley v. Kilburn"
that "[o]rdinarily a party who seeks to invoke the provisions
of the nonresident motorist statute is entitled to rely on the
accuracy of the address given to a police officer conducting an
" KRS § 188.030 (1971).
5, 68 S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1934).
" Id. at 769. See also Hertz' You Drive It Yourself Systems, Inc. v. Castle, 317
S.W.2d 177 (Ky. 1958).
218 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1949).
, Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
68 S.W.2d at 769.
Id. at 768,.citing Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
'7 218 S.W.2d at 19.
545 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1976).
[Vol. 66
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investigation of an accident." 9 Of course, this may be neither
the correct address nor the last known address. This would
seem to be a further retraction of the service requirements of
KRS Chapter 188. As for Priddy v. Swimme, 60 plaintiff gave the
secretary of state the defendant's last known address, but it
was an address where the plaintiff knew the defendant could
not be found. It was also a local address and it would seem that
the circuit court should not even allow an amended complaint
to be filed when service of process is sought under KRS §
188.030 of the Nonresident Motorists Act when the pleading
lists a local address for the defendant. The same should be true
when no address is listed at all, as was the case in Aetna Insur-
ance Co. v. Kuszynski.1 By the same logic, it would seem rea-
sonable for the circuit clerk to refuse to issue a summons on the
secretary of state when no out-of-state address of the defendant
appears in the original complaint.
Ill. PARTIES
A. The Real Party in Interest
1. Corporations
In Miller v. Paducah Airport Corp.,62 the plaintiff owned
three corporations, Yellow Cab U-Drive-It Co., Inc., National
Car Rental Systems, and Yellow Cab. He brought an action
challenging the legality of a lease by which the defendant oper-
ated an airport. The dispute arose because the defendant
would not grant Yellow Cab U-Drive-It Co. space in the ter-
minal to operate a car rental service. Without reaching the
merits of the case, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that the
corporation, not Miller, was the real party in interest and dis-
missed the case.
Likewise, in Bailey v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,63 the plain-
tiff owned a corporation known as Cable Service, Inc. The cor-
poration had a joint use agreement with the defendant, which
the defendant cancelled, resulting in the law suit. Although the
Id. at 927.
555 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. App. 1977).
" 547 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1977) (mer.).
551 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1977).
No. 75-1103 (Ky. Dec. 17, 1976 mem. per curiam).
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plaintiff, as president of the corporation, had signed the con-
tract, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the corporation was the real party in interest.
It has long been settled that an individual stockholder of
a corporation cannot bring an action in his own name or in his
own behalf for a wrong committed solely against the corpora-
tion. This is true even though the stockholder is the sole or
majority stockholder. 4 Kentucky's law on this is well-
established. 5 There are exceptions, notably a stockholder's
derivative action,"6 but none is applicable to either the Miller
or Bailey case.
2. Subrogations
It is common practice for insurance companies to settle
first-party claims with their own insureds, then subrogate
against a third-party tortfeasorY Because of the natural preju-
dice juries often exhibit against insurance companies, the com-
panies devised the "loan receipt" method of settling with their
own insureds. By this fiction, the company only loans the
money to the insured who is then required to repay it from
proceeds he might obtain in a suit against the third party. This
allows the insurance company to finance the suit against the
third party but bring it in the name of its insured. This method
of litigating subrogation claims has been approved in Ken-
tucky. 6 However, the fiction is tolerated only insofar as the
facts surrounding the settlement will support a "loan" theory.
Thus, in the 1973 case of Biven v. Charlie's Hobby Shop,6" a
"loan receipt" was not allowed when the insurance company
making the settlement was not the insurer of the injured party,
but rather the insurer of another defendant.70
19 AM. JuR. 2d Corporations §§ 525, 526 (1965).
Wenk v. Ruby, 412 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1967); Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 174
S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1943); Collier v. Deering Campground Ass'n, 66 S.W. 183 (Ky. 1902).
6, 19 AM. JuR.2d Corporations § 528 (1965).
" See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roark, 517 S.W.2d 737 (Ky. 1974);
New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 148 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1941).
" Ratcliff v. Smith, 298 S.W.2d 18 (Ky. 1957); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Hall, 165 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1942).
,1 500 S.W.2d 597 (Ky. 1973).
10 Note, however, that the insurance carrier of one joint tortfeasor, after having
made settlement with the injured party, is subrogated to its insured's right to
[Vol. 66
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In Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. Faulkner,7" the
plaintiff sued the uninsured motorist, but then settled with his
own uninsured motorist carrier. An agreed order was entered
in court reciting the settlement with the insurance company
and reserving the insurance company's right of subrogation
against the defendant uninsured motorist. On the day of trial,
the court sustained the defendant's motion to substitute the
insurance company as party plaintiff, since it was the real
party in interest. This was done, despite the fact the insurance
company produced a loan receipt executed after the agreed
order of dismissal had been entered. This ruling was affirmed
on appeal, with the court simply noting that the language of
the agreed order was couched in terms of payment and settle-
ment, rather than in terms of a loan. In effect, the court is
saying that if the company wishes to avail itself of the loan
receipt fiction, it should obtain the loan receipt at the time it
pays the money. Viewed under simple contract theory, if the
insured had already settled with the insurer, what considera-




In City of Ashland v. Kelley, 3 a suit was brought by cer-
tain property owners against the city to require the city to
make a uniform reassessment of all real estate within the city
at its fair cash value. Of course, the plaintiffs' property was
already assessed at its fair cash value, so the suit was really
aimed at those citizens whose property was under-assessed.
The city's initial defense was that the cost of reappraisal would
be too great. However, on appeal, it developed that the city's
real concern was whether it was entitled to the additional
revenue which would be produced by applying the present tax
contribution from the other joint tortfeasor. Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Department
of Highways, 414 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1967); Leitner v. Hawkins, 223 S.W.2d 988 (Ky,
1949).
71 553 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. App. 1977).
71 Cf. Howard v. McNeil, 78 S.W. 142 (Ky. 1904) (promise given by the purchaser,
after the making of a contract of sale to pay vendor a sum of money in addition to the
consideration recited in the contract, and which was not considered in determining the
price, is without consideration).
n 555 S.W.2d 821 (Ky. App. 1977) (discretionary review granted Oct. 14, 1977).
1978]
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rate to a tax assessment base increased due to net assessment
growth derived from a professional appraisal. Stripped to the
bare bones/ this appears to be a collusive suit designed to en-
sure that the reassessment and resulting additional income
could be realized without danger that the validity of the assess-
ment would be subject to a collateral attack by an aggrieved
under-assessed property owner. The circuit court ordered the
reassessment. The court of appeals correctly noted that the
persons most directly affected by such a ruling, i.e., the under-
assessed property owners, were not represented in this suit.
This suit did not begin as a declaratory judgment action,
but it became one when the city asked the circuit court to
determine whether it could keep monies raised as a result of the
reassessment. It was at that point that the circuit court should
have joined a representative of the under-assessed property
owners.74 But even if declaratory relief had not been sought, the
circuit court could not have ruled on the original cause of ac-
tion without affecting the interest of the under-assessed prop-
erty owners.75 Thus, identifying the error was only a matter of
understanding the true nature and purpose of the suit.
IV. JURISDICTION
A. The Long Arm Statute
In Volvo of America Corp. v. Wells,7" the suit was for
breach of warranty and was brought against the foreign manu-
facturer, its distributor, and a dealer in Huntington, West Vir-
ginia. The purchase was made at the dealer's place of business
in West Virginia, but the vehicle was delivered to Paintsville,"
Kentucky, where the bill of sale was also delivered and where
the plaintiff delivered his trade-in along with his bill of sale on
that vehicle. The manufacturer and distributor apparently had
no business offices in Kentucky and no ownership interest in
the dealership that sold the vehicle (although this is not specif-
ically stated in the opinion). Jurisdiction over the manufac-
-' KRS § 418.075 (1972). See Ky. R. Civ. P. 23.01.
75 Ky. R. Civ. P. 19.01; cf. Whittaker v. Combs, 253 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1952)(judg-
ment in a proceeding for the partition of land not final because all the tenants in
common were not parties to the suit).
71 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. App. 1977).
[Vol. 66
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turer and distributor was alleged under the Kentucky Long
Arm Statute.7
It is not this author's purpose to write a dissertation on the
development of in personam jurisdiction over non-resident
manufacturers. 78 Suffice it to say, however, that there are three
issues to be determined in these cases: (1) Whether the long
arm statute enacted by the state legislature confers jurisdiction
on the state court under the particular facts of the case sub
judice; (2) whether the language of the statute itself satisfies
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution; and (3) whether the applica-
tion of the statute under the particular facts of this case vio-
lates the due process rights of this particular defendant.
7
1
The issues will be discussed in the above order, but since
some courts have exhibited confusion over which theory applies
to which issue, the basic constitutional requirements must al-
ways be kept in mind. This leads back to International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,ss where the United States Supreme Court
held that, in order to satisfy due process requirements, it must
7 KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(5) (Supp. 1976) provides:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts di-
rectly or by an agent, as to a claim arising from the person's:
5. Causing injury in this commonwealth to any person by breach of
warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this com-
monwealth when the seller knew such a person would use, consume or be
affected by, the goods in this commonwealth, if he also regularly does or
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services ren-
dered in this commonwealth (emphasis added).
' For an exhaustive treatment, see Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 13 (1968).
7 There is disagreement over which question should be answered first. One view
is that the court should decide first what jurisdiction the state has legislated for itself
within its permissive area by the enactment of the statute, then decide the constitu-
tional question. Old Westbury Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Mitchell, 254 N.Y.S.2d
679 (Sup. Ct. 1964), affl'd, 262 N.Y.S.2d 438 (App. Div. 1965), affl'd, 273 N.Y.S.2d 418,
219 N.E.2d 868 (1966). This view is consistent with the general principle that courts
will not pass on the constitutionality of an act of the legislature if the case before the
court may be decided without doing so, e.g., by a narrow construction of the act. 16
AM. JuR.2d Constitutional Law § 113 (1964). The other view is that the court should
first decide how much power the state had to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents
without personal service, then interpret the state law to determine if the case falls
within that power. Temco, Inc. v. General Screw Prod., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
be shown that the defendant had "certain minimum contacts"
within the territory of the forum and that the exercise of juris-
diction does not "offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."8' Although this seems broad enough, the
Supreme Court has set certain restrictions for determining
what constitutes "minimum contacts." In Hanson v.
Denckla, 2 it was pointed out that what "is essential in each
case [is] that there be some act by which the defendant pur-
posefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws.
'83
1. Scope of the Statute
It has been held that a foreign manufacturer subjects itself
to local jurisdiction when it introduces its product into inter-
state commerce under circumstances that make it reasonable
to expect that the product may enter the forum state.84 This is
the so-called "stream of commerce" theory first promulgated
by the Illinois judiciary in the case of Gray v. American Radia-
tor & Standard Sanitary Corp. :85 "Where the alleged liability
arises, as in this case, from the manufacture of products pre-
sumably sold in contemplation of use here, it should not matter
that the purchase was made from an independent middleman
or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product
into this State. '
86
However, the "stream of commerce" theory is not a substi-
tute for the "minimum contacts" requirement of International
Shoe. The courts which have adopted the "stream of com-
merce" theory use it to justify a finding that a particular for-
eign manufacturer has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction
contemplated by the local statute. Since the Kentucky Court
of Appeals specifically adopted the "stream of commerce"
Id. at 316.
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 253.
m Jetco Electronics, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973), reh. denied,
474 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1973); Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 413 P.2d 732
(Ariz. 1966).
176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961); see also Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F.
Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
176 N.E.2d at 766.
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theory in the Volvo case, 7 the distinction does become impor-
tant. Most of the jurisdictions which have adopted the theory
have done so in tort cases. For example, in Eyerly Aircraft Co.
v. Killian,"5 a case interpreting Texas law, and the case upon
which the Kentucky court relied heavily in deciding the consti-
tutional question, jurisdiction was sought under a statute
which confers jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has
committed "any tort in whole or in part in this State." 9 These
"tortious act" statutes are constitutional" and obviously are
broader in scope than KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(5), the breach of
warranty section of the Kentucky statute, which applied to the
Volvo case. KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(4), the "tortious injury" sec-
tion of Kentucky's statute, confers jurisdiction for an injury
within the state caused by an act or omission outside the state.
However, the "breach of warranty" section of the statute limits
jurisdiction involving sales outside the state only to those situa-
tions where the seller knew that the buyer would "use, con-
sume, or be affected by"91 the goods in this state.
Virginia has a statute" identical to Kentucky's breach of
warranty provision except it substitutes "could reasonably ex-
pect such person would use, etc." for "knew such person would
use, etc." This Virginia statute has been held to confer jurisdic-
tion in cases where products are shipped into Virginia by some-
one other than the manufacturer, primarily because the manu-
facturer could "reasonably expect Virginia residents to use and
be affected by" the product. 3 Nothing can be gained by hy-
" 551 S.W.2d at 827.
414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 2031 b § 4 (Vernon)(1964).
h Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965).
, KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(5) (Supp. 1976).
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(5) (1977) provides:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts di-
rectly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's
5. Causing injury in this State to any person by breach of warranty
expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this State when he
might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected
by the goods in this State, provided that he also regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this
State ....
" Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co., 249 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1965); Jackson
v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 248 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Va. 1965).
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pothesizing whether the results would have been the same had
the Virginia statute required the manufacturer to actually
know, rather than just reasonably expect, that his product
would be used in that state. It is a matter of statutory interpre-
tation and the Kentucky legislature obviously had a reason for
substituting the word "knew" for the words "could reasonably
expect."
Although the court of appeals cited no precedent for
adopting the "stream of commerce" theory in subjecting Volvo
to KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(5), this interpretation by a Kentucky
court had been predicted by a federal court as early as 1969.
In Miller v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,94 suit was brought
against a manufacturer of aircraft instruments, which had sub-
sequently been installed by another company in an airplane
which crashed at a Kentucky airport. The only event that oc-
curred in Kentucky was the crash. It was held that the manu-
facturer of the instruments "must have known that buyers of
its products, such as General Dynamics, would sell airplanes
to airlines which would fly into Kentucky, and consequently
must have known that plaintiffs decedent [an airline passen-
ger] would 'use, consume or be affected by' the goods in Ken-
tucky."9 Thus, the requirement that the manufacturer "knew"
was satisfied by a finding that he "must have known." (The
manufacturer denied actual knowledge.) In Volvo, the court of
appeals went even further:
It must be assumed that these defendants-appellants knew or
should have known that the vehicles they shipped to this
particular dealer in Huntington, West Virginia, would be
likely to end up being owned and driven by citizens and resi-
dents of the state of Kentucky, the state of Ohio, as well as
West Virginia, since Huntington is the commercial center of
the tri-state area of these three (3) states."
By interpreting "knew" to mean "must have known" or
"should have known" or "assumed to have known," how close
are we to Virginia's "could reasonably expect"?
302 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Ky. 1969).
" Id. at 177.
551 S.W.2d Et 827-28 (emphasis added).
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2. Constitutionality of the Statute
Although the court of appeals relied on Eyerly Aircraft Co.
v. Killian97 in finding the statute prima facie constitutional, its
reliance on that case was probably ill-founded. As pointed out
above, Killian involved the constitutionality of Texas'
"tortious act" statute. 8 Reliance would have been better
placed upon the cases interpreting the Virginia statute, since
it is identical to Kentucky's in recognizing jurisdiction only "if
[the foreign defendant] also regularly does or solicits business,
or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in this commonwealth."" In interpreting the Virginia
statute, a federal court noted that "the use of the International
Shoe due process words 'regularly,' 'persistent,' *and
'substantial,' place this provision well within the permissible
limits of due process as set down by the Supreme Court."'' 0
Certainly, this statute is more restrictive than the "tortious
act" statutes, so if the latter are constitutional, a fortiori, the
former must also be constitutional. 01
3. Constitutionality of the Application of the Statute to these
Defendants
Having determined that the statute meets the constitu-
tional test of requiring "minimum contacts," the next question
is whether the particular defendant has sufficient "minimum
contacts" to satisfy the requirement. It first should be pointed
out that the alleged "contact" upon which jurisdiction is to be
based need not be immediately related to the cause of action
presently before the court. In Eyerley Aircraft Company v.
Killian, 0 1 the defective product in question had not been
shipped directly to Texas, but had found its way through the
"stream of commerce" to Texas, where the injury occurred.
Although this would have satisfied the requirements of Texas'
"tortious act" statute, it presumably would have been insuffi-
" 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
'A EX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 2031b § 4 (Vemon)(1964).
" KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(5) (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(5) (1977).
Etzler v. Dille & McGuire Mfg. Co., 241 F. Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Va. 1965).
101 Id.
j2 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
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cient to satisfy the "minimum contacts" requirements of
International Shoe and Hanson. Thus, the court had to find
other contacts, and it found that the manufacturer had shipped
at least two other products to Texas in the past and had
shipped spare parts to Texas addresses, which parts presuma-
bly were used in repairing its products.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals failed to address specifi-
cally this aspect of the constitutional question in Volvo; how-
ever, the court did discuss Volvo's "contacts" in deciding
whether the requirements of the statute were met.
[T]he record shows that Volvo advertises in the state of
Kentucky. Also, Volvo states in its driver's manual that its
dealers are authorized to service Volvos anywhere in the
country, including dealerships in Kentucky. . . . Although
there was no direct evidence in the record, it must be as-
sumed that Volvo derived substantial profits from the sale of
Volvo automobiles in the state of Kentucky.
0 3
In a case containing a virtually identical fact situation, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed itself directly to the
"minimum contacts" requirement. In Velandra v. Regie Na-
tionale Des Usines Renault,104 the manufacturer of foreign au-
tomobiles and its United States importer were held not subject
to in personam jurisdiction in Michigan even though there were
Renault dealers in Michigan doing a substantial business and
a warranty was delivered at the time of sale (to which warranty
the manufacturer was a party). The vehicle was purchased by
the plaintiffs in Ohio, but the cause of action arose in Michi-
gan. The manufacturer was the sole owner of stock of both the
importer and the Illinois distributor, whose region included
Michigan. The Sixth Circuit stated:
In determining whether minimum contacts exist on the basis
of the presence of sale or a product within a state, the extent
of the contact is related to a number of factors, including the
number and value of sales within the state, their ratio to the
total market for like or similar products within the state, the
quantity or value of the defendants' production, the percen-
tage of the total output sold within the state, as well as the
"1 551 S.W.2d at 828.
04 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964).
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nature of the product, particularly with reference to whether
it is inherently dangerous or not. Obviously the manufacturer
of a product that has a significant market within a state has
more contact with that state than one whose product only has
a minimal market. Likewise, a manufacturer whose total
product or a large percentage of whose product is sold within
a state has a more significant contact with that state than
would be the case where only casual sales were made within
the state or only a small portion of the manufacturer's pro-
duction was sold within the state. Finally, the nature of the
product may well have a bearing upon the issue of minimum
contact, with a lesser volume of inherently dangerous prod-
ucts constituting a more significant contact with the state
than would a larger volume of products offering little or no
hazard to the inhabitants of the state. A careful and discrimi-
nating analysis of the nature and quality of the defendants'
contacts with the foreign state must be made in each case." 5
It was held in Renault that evidence that showed there
were three Renault dealers in Detroit, one of whose gross sales
of Renault automobiles exceeded $100,000, together with the
evidence concerning the warranties being delivered with the
automobiles, was not sufficient evidence of "minimum con-
tacts." Yet, there was more evidence of Michigan contacts in
that case than evidence of Kentucky contacts in the Volvo case.
Interestingly, Renault conspicuously has not been followed
even by district courts within the same circuit. In Stewart v.
Bus and Car Co.,"08 a district court in Ohio, in interpreting a
statute0 7 identical to the Virginia statute previously dis-
cussed,' 8 held there was jurisdiction even though the defective
bus was not sold in Ohio, since the injury occurred there and
the defendant had sold two other buses in Ohio. (Note the facts
on this issue are virtually identical to those in Eyerly Aircraft
Company v. Killian."10) In trying to distinguish the Renault
case, the court noted that "this Court views the sale of a com-
mercial passenger bus into Ohio as markedly different from the
" Id. at 297-98.
," 293 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
107 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A)(5)(Anderson)(Supp. 1976).
1"' VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(5)(1977). See notes 91-95 and accompanying
text supra for a discussion of the Virginia statute.
1- 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
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sale of a small automobile""' 0 because a bus is more likely to
carry Ohio passengers, and a bus is more expensive than an
automobile. In Miller v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,"' a Ken-
tucky district court judge made no effort whatsoever to distin-
guish Renault but merely cited Stewart as drawing the appro-
priate distinctions. One is left to wonder why the Stewart and
Miller cases were not appealed.
Although no further appeal was taken in Volvo, it would
be dangerous to assume that mere evidence showing a foreign
corporation advertises within the state and authorizes dealers
to service its product within the state is now sufficient to satisfy
the "minimum contacts" requirement. This is a constitutional
question and a close reading of International Shoe and Hanson
v. Denckla"2 would indicate that something more is required
in the way of "minimum contacts" than was proven in Volvo.
However, one is forced to admit that Miller v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.," 3 was a broader application of the statute than
Volvo, so it is reasonable to expect that Volvo does not repre-
sent the outer limits to which Kentucky's courts will attempt
to stretch the "long arm" of this particular statute.
Liberal interpretation of the long arm statute was also
required in Johnson v. Smith"' and Conley v. Sousa."' In each
case, the defendant was a resident of the state of Kentucky at
the time of the alleged tort, but had left the state and was
therefore a nonresident at the time suit was filed. The cases
required interpretation of the "tortious injury" provision of the
long arm statute."'
In Johnson, the defendant ingeniously pointed out that
KRS § 188.070, part of the Nonresident Motorists Act, specifi-
cally allows jurisdiction to be taken by a Kentucky court under
that Act when the defendant was a resident at the time of the
accident, but thereafter became a nonresident; whereas KRS
,,0 Stewart v. Bus and Car Co., 293 F. Supp. 577, 585-86 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
"' 302 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Ky. 1969).
112 357 U.S. 253 (1958).
"1 302 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Ky. 1969).
"' 551 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. App. 1977).
I's 554 S.W.2d 87 (Ky. 1977).
I'6 KRS § 454.210(2)(a)(3) (Supp. 1976) provides: "A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a claim arising from




§ 454.210 contains no such language. This, it was argued, indi-
cates an intent on the part of the legislature to limit the appli-
cation of KRS § 454.210 to those persons who were nonresidents
at the time of the alleged tortious act. The court of appeals
emphasized that KRS § 454.210 relates to a claim arising from
the tortious act and that the determining factor was whether
the person was a nonresident at the time the claim was asserted
in court.
Faced with the same problem, the Supreme Court in
Conley reached the same result with different reasoning. The
Court emphasized in that case that the purpose of the long arm
statute is to provide jurisdiction over nonresidents, regardless
of whether the nonresidency occurred before or after the tor-
tious act. In both cases, jurisdiction was upheld.
B. Diversity of Citizenship
In Saylor v. General Motors Corp."7 a products liability
case, the plaintiff sued both the resident dealer and the nonres-
ident manufacturer. The dealer was subsequently granted a
summary judgment and the manufacturer forthwith filed a
petition for removal to federal district court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1446(b). The manufacturer argued (1) the dismissal
of the resident defendant from the case created diversity of
citizenship, or (2) the initial action against the resident defen-
dant constituted collusive joinder.
In resolving the first question, the district judge had to
decide whether the 1949 Amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)"8
did away with the voluntary-involuntary test which had been
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in American Car
and Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake."I In a decision which was both
W' 416 F. Supp. 1173 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
" If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a Petition
for Removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is
one which is or has become removable.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1970).
"' 236 U.S. 311 (1915). Under the voluntary-involuntary test "[i]f .. . [the]
plaintiff states a non-removable case in his initial complaint, involuntary changes will
not make the case removable; they must have been brought about by the voluntary
act of the plaintiff." 1A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTCE 0.168 [3.-5] at 487 (2d ed. 1974).
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well-reasoned and amply supported by authority, the court
ruled that the voluntary-involuntary test was still applicable.
Thus, since the summary judgment granted to the resident
defendant was not a voluntary act on the part of the plaintiff
(although there was some indication his objection thereto was
less than strenuous), the dismissal of the resident defendant
did not make the case removable. As pointed out in the court's
opinion, the reason for the voluntary-involuntary test is that in
case of an involuntary dismissal of one party to a multi-party
action, the dismissal may be interlocutory (as was the case
here) and therefore not final and appealable until a final dispo-
sition is made of the claim against all other parties. 2 '
As for the claim of collusive joinder, it is well settled that
the test is not whether the local defendant was added to defeat
removal, but whether a legitimate cause of action against the
local defendant is stated under applicable state law.'21 Whether
the cause of action is legitimate or a fabrication is purely and
simply a question of examining the pleadings and the local
law.'22 The motive of the plaintiff in suing the local defendant
is irrelevant in determining jurisdiction. 1' Obviously, a dealer
who sells a defective product can be held liable under Ken-
tucky law,' 24 so the claim of collusive joinder was rejected and
the case remanded to the state court.
V. PLEADING
A. The Complaint
In Skaggs v. Vaughn,'2 5 plaintiff filed suit on January 21,
1974, seeking to set aside a deed dated November 29, 1968. The
120 See Ky. R. CIr. P. 54.02.
,2, Continental Oil Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
"1 Hukill v. Maysville & B. S. R. Co., 72 F. 745 (Cir. Court, D. Ky. 1896); Fine v.
Braniff Airways, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Okla. 1969); Broadway Coal Mining Co.
v. Robinson, 150 S.W. 1000 (Ky. 1912).
l23 Dudley v. Community Pub. Serv. Co., 108 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1939); Morris
v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 68 F.2d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1934); Howard v. General
Motors Corp., 287 F. Supp. 646, 648 (N.D. Miss. 1968); Hoffman v. Metz, 31 F. Supp.
204, 206 (M.D. Pa. 1940); Donaldson v. Tucson Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 14
F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Ariz. 1935).
"2 Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973); Belcher v. Hamilton,
475 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1972).
'1' 550 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. App. 1977).
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complaint alleged fraud, mistake and undue influence. Sum-
mary judgment was granted to the defendant grantees of the
deed and plaintiff appealed. KRS § 413.120(12) provides that
an action for relief or damages on the grounds of fraud or mis-
take must be filed within five years after the cause of action
accrued. On the other hand, KRS § 413.130(3) provides that
such an action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery of the fraud or mistake, but that the action shall be
commenced within ten years of the time the fraud or mistake
occurred. This ten-year limitation has been held to be absolute,
regardless of the date of discovery.'26
As stated above, Skaggs' complaint alleged fraud, mistake
and undue influence, thus apparently satisfying the require-
ment of Civil Rule (CR) 9.02 that averments of fraud or mis-
take be stated with particularity. The defendants pleaded limi-
tations, thus satisfying the requirements of CR 8.03 that af-
firmative defenses be set forth in a pleading to a preceding
pleading. However, the court sustained a dismissal of the com-
plaint for failure of the plaintiff to plead that the fraud or
mistake was not discovered within the five-year period and
that it could not have been discovered sooner by the exercise
of reasonable diligence.
In Boone v. Gonzalez,"7 plaintiff filed suit on January 18,
1972, seeking a divorce from John H. Boone, whom she had
married on October 3, 1966. On September 8, 1972, she filed
an amended complaint alleging that the marriage was biga-
mous. On April 13, 1973, she amended again, seeking damages
for fraudulent misrepresentation of Boone's marital status. It
was undenied that the marriage was bigamous. Boone's answer
to the second amended complaint did not specifically allege
limitations, but included a motion to dismiss on the basis of
limitations.' 8 Plaintiff's attorney made an oral offer to amend
I" Hernandez v. Daniel, 471 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1971).
,' 550 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. App. 1977).
" Plaintiff claimed on appeal that defendant waived limitations by failing to
plead it affirmatively as a defense. See Ky. R. Civ. P. 8.03. Of course, the complaint
on its face showed that the action was barred by limitations, so the defense was
properly raised by a motion to dismiss. Rather v. Allen County War Memorial Hospi-
tal, 429 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1968). In view of the degree of the technicality imposed by
the court on the plaintiffs in these cases, we note in passing that Civil Rule (CR) 12.02
requires that such a motion "shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
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prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, but
the trial court overruled the motion, thus making the amend-
ment unnecessary. Defendant appealed from a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff.
In both Skaggs and Boone, more than five years had
elapsed from the date of the alleged fraud. However, neither
complaint alleged that the fraud was not discovered or could
not have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary care
within the five-year period, which would invoke the saving pro-
visions of KRS § 413.130(3). In both appeals (which were ren-
dered the same day and written by the same judge), the court
of appeals relied on the case of Justice v. Graham'2 in ruling
that the complaints should have been dismissed. However,
Justice was decided before the adoption of the new civil rules,
which now provide only for "notice" pleading. '
If our rules require only "notice" pleading and if a com-
plaint shows prima facie that the basic statute of limitations
has run on the cause of action, then (unless saved by another
statute) the defendant should have notice that the plaintiff is
relying on the saving statute, because otherwise the plaintiff's
claim is barred. The civil rules provide that limitations must
be specifically pleaded as an affirmative defense.'3' Nowhere do
the civil rules provide that grounds for the avoidance of that
defense must be affirmatively pleaded. Resurrection and appli-
cation of this ancient and hoary rule of pleading can only serve
to thwart in this instance the intent of the new rules. The result
in both cases was disastrous. The Boone case was reversed with
order to dismiss the complaint, but without prejudice, because
of the oral motion to amend which had been made at the time
the motion to dismiss was overruled. If this oral motion had not
been placed in the record, then plaintiff would have been for-
permitted." Ky. R. Civ. P. 12.02 (emphasis added). Boone included his motion to
dismiss in his answer to the second amended complaint.
1' 246 S.W.2d 135 (Ky. 1952).
1' See Ky. R. Civ. P. 8.01. This point was raised in the Skaggs case, but the court
noted that the old rule had been reiterated in Madison County v. Arnett, 360 S.W.2d
208, 210 (Ky. 1962). In that case, the plaintiff, perhaps in an abundance of caution,
had pleaded the requirements of KRS § 413.130(3) by way of amended complaint, so
the necessity for a specific pleading was not actually raised in the case and the reitera-
tion of the old rule was only dictum.
3 Ky. R. Civ. P. 8.03.
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ever barred, since the court of appeals' opinion dismissing her
original complaint was rendered more than ten years after the
cause of action originally arose. Still, she loses her judgment
because of this technicality and must try her case again from
the beginning. Skaggs was even less fortunate. By failing to
offer to amend, his claim was lost.
In Hill v. Atherton,'32 the action was one for medical mal-
practice and the complaint averred general negligence in the
performance of a vasectomy. The answer was in the form of a
general denial. All of the evidence indicated the surgery was
performed in conformance with the applicable standards of
care, and summary judgment was granted in favor of the defen-
dant. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed there was a genuine
issue of fact on the question of lack of informed consent. In
affirming the summary judgment, the Supreme Court tersely
noted: "Hill's argument that a general charge of negligence
against Dr. Atherton included the issue of lack of informed
consent has no merit. The issue of lack of informed consent was
not presented to the trial court. Issues not raised in the trial
court are not preserved for appellate review.
' '' 3
Since the appeal was from a summary judgment and not
a directed verdict, it must be presumed that the court was
talking about the sufficiency of the complaint, not the suffi-
ciency of the evidence. As recently as 1974, Kentucky's highest
court had held in Roberson v. Lampton134 that when a genuine
issue on a material fact is properly joined by the pleadings, a
trial is the only battleground and that a litigant cannot be
forced to a premature disclosure of evidence by motion for sum-
mary judgment.' 35 This principle was reiterated by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court as recently as May 20, 1977 (seven
months after deciding Hill) in Harlow v. Harlow.'
36
The nature of a claim of lack of informed consent was
addressed at length in Holton v. Pfingst.'37 After a long analysis
of the problem, the then Court of Appeals (now Supreme
Court) of Kentucky reached the conclusion that the issue
'2 No. 73-1094 (Ky. Oct. 29, 1976 mem. per. curiam).
1- Id.
" 516 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1974).
"I Id. at 839-40, quoting Payne v. Chenault, 343 S.W.2d 129, 132 (Ky. 1961).
' 551 S.W.2d 230 (Ky. 1977).
" 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1974).
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should be viewed as one of simple negligence. "[W]e are per-
suaded that the prevailing view to the effect that the action,
regardless of its form, is in reality one for negligence in failing
to conform to a proper professional standard is the soundest
approach."'38
Though there is some authority to the effect that unusual
allegations should be pleaded with specificity so that the defen-
dant will be given "at least an intimation of the issues it will
be forced to meet and answer"'19 if the failure to furnish suffi-
cient information to permit a patient to exercise informed con-
sent is viewed simply as a matter of negligence, it would seem
that a general averment of negligent treatment is sufficient to
state a cause of action.'40 The issue may very well have been
an appropriate one for a motion for more definite statement,'
but it appears no such motion was made. Clearly, this case
should not have been dismissed on a motion for summary judg-
ment. Just as clearly, if our appellate courts are going to write
new law which overrules existing precedent, they should do so
in published opinions, not unpublished memorandum opinions
which serve no notice to members of the practicing bar.
B. Motion for a More Definite Statement
In Reisert v. Apple Valley Resort, Inc.,'4 2 defendants filed
a motion for a more definite statement and the motion was
sustained. Most of the defects of which the defendants com-
plained4 3 appear to be matters concerning which the defendant
' Id. at 788.
"' Department of Highways v. Kennard, 342 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Ky. 1961).
10 Cf. Cincinnati, Newport & Covington Transp. Co. v. Fischer, 357 S.W.2d 870
(Ky. 1962) (technical pleading not required, only necessary to give defendant notice
and identify the claim; specific facts in plaintiff's complaint not sufficient to narrow
plaintiffs allegation of general negligence).
"' See Ky. R. Cr. P. 12.05. See notes 148-151 and accompanying text infra for a
further discussion of the proper application of this rule.
12 551 S.W.2d 256 (Ky. App. 1977).
13 1. The plaintiffs alleged that Otto F. Knop is the successor in inter-
est of the defendant corporation, but they did not state what is a successor
in interest.
2. The plaintiffs did not specify the agents who made the certain induce-
ments except for William F. Clarkson, III.
3. The plaintiffs failed to file or state with particularity the written repre-
sentations which caused the inducements.
4. The plaintiffs did not allege who holds their monies, the amount thereof
[Vol. 66
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probably had more knowledge than the plaintiff,"' or matters
of evidence which should normally be the subject of discov-
ery. 45 However, the grant or denial of such a motion is largely
within the discretion of the trial judge4 ' and in this case, the
judge did grant the plaintiffs forty-four days in which to com-
ply with the order. It appears that during the forty-four-day
period, plaintiffs served several notices to take depositions of
the defendants and after the expiration of the period, they
served requests for production of documents pursuant to CR
34.01 and requests for admissions pursuant to CR 36.01. How-
ever, when the action was finally dismissed, eighty-one days
after the order was entered, no discovery evidence had been
filed. Worse, neither had an amended complaint been filed
pursuant to the court's order. Nor did the plaintiffs file a mo-
tion for an extension of time in which to comply with the
court's order.
Perhaps plaintiffs could have avoided dismissal by asking
for an extension of time within which to comply, but that is not
the point. The motion for a more definite statement should not
have been granted in the first place. When Kentucky adopted
the new civil rules, it adopted "notice" pleading.
The purpose of [CR 8.01] is to assign to pleadings the func-
tion of giving notice and formulating true issues without the
requirement that they detail every fact which in the past may
have been necessary to constitute a formal 'cause of action'
or a defense. The common law concept of pleading to an issue
is completely abandoned. 4
or the terms and conditions of the deposit.
5. The plaintiffs did not file the contract or state with particularity its
terms and conditions.
6. Although the plaintiffs alleged that they have performed all conditions
of the contract required to be performed by them, they have not filed the
contract or stated with particularity its terms and conditions.
7. The plaintiffs have not stated with particularity any of the facts consti-
tuting fraud, bad faith or illegality.
8. The plaintiffs have not alleged the terms and conditions of the commit-
ments which the defendants refused to honor.
Reisert v. Apple Valley Resort, Inc., 551 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. App. 1977).
"' See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 136 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1940).
", Slusher v. Jones, 3 F.R.D. 168 (E.D. Ky. 1943).
"' Alvey v. Kern, 354 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1962).
" 6 CLAY, KENTUCKY PRACTIC 131, Civil Rule 8.01, Comment 2 (3d ed. 1974).
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The only purpose of CR 12.05, the motion for a more definite
statement, is to clear up vagueness or ambiguity so as to allow
the opposing party to formulate intelligently a responsive
pleading.' It is not to be used to nullify the purpose of CR
8.01.'11 The complaint in this case, even as summarized by the
court of appeals, was sufficient'to put anyone on notice of the
nature and grounds of the claim for relief.'5 0 More than that is
not required, and a dismissal of this complaint on grounds of
failure to make a more definite statement was a particularly
harsh result that amounts to a throwback to the tradition of
evidence pleading which existed prior to the adoption of our
present rules. This is particularly obvious in this case where the
plaintiffs' frantic attempts to obtain discovery of the informa-
tion sought in the motion for a more definite statement indi-
cate that the specifics sought by the defendants were peculiarly
within their own knowledge.'51
C. The Answer
In Hankins v. Cooper,'52 a complaint was filed and sum-
mons issued with the address for the defendants listed as West
Point, Hardin County, Kentucky. It was subsequently learned
that defendants lived in Shepherdsville, Bullitt County, Ken-
tucky and they were served with an alias summons on January
22, 1976. On February 10, 1976, an unsigned answer and coun-
terclaim were filed pro se by the defendants. This answer was
not served on plaintiff's attorney, but on March 11, 1976, the
circuit clerk advised plaintiffs attorney that the document had
hA Kellogg v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 11 F.R.D. 168 (W.D. La. 1951).
"9 Id.; United States v. Kralman, 3 F.R.D. 473 (E.D. Ky. 1943).
" The complaint alleged that plaintiffs:
had contracted with Apple Valley to purchase a condominium, that Clark-
son, the president and a director of Apple Valley, in his capacity as agent,
represented that the plaintiffs could receive the return of their deposit after
inspecting the condominium unit and that after the inspection, the defen-
dant wrongfully, fraudulently and in bad faith refused to return the deposit.
The plaintiffs requested the rescission of all transaction between the plain-
tiffs and the defendants, the refund of all monies paid by plaintiff to defen-
dants with interest and exemplary damages.
Reisert v. Apple Valley Resort, Inc., 551 S.W.2d 256, 257 (Ky. App. 1977).
"I See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Smith, 136 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1940); 6
CLAY, KENTUCKY PACTICE 214, Civil Rule 12.05, Comment 2 (3d ed. 1974).
152 551 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. App. 1977).
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been filed. Plaintiff was subsequently granted a default judg-
ment, although no written notice of the application for default
was sent to the defendant as required by CR 55.01. The case
was appealed on the circuit court's refusal to set aside the
default. The primary issue on appeal was whether the unsigned
* "answer" constituted an appearance in the action which would
entitle the defendants to the three-day notice requirement re-
quired by CR 55.01. The court of appeals held it did.
The court relied on Smith v. Gadd,53 wherein the following
test was established: "In construing the word 'appeared' in CR
55.01, we are of the opinion that it means the defendant has
voluntarily taken a step in the main action that shows or from
which it may be inferred that he has the intention of making
some defense." ' 4
On the other hand, CR 11 provides that "if a pleading is
not signed . . . it may be striken as sham and false and the
action may proceed as though the pleading had not been filed."
However, this does not mean that failure to sign a pleading is
grounds for dismissal. As was pointed out by Commissioner
Clay in Commonwealth v. Utley,'5 5 the rule also provides the
remedy-a motion to strike on grounds that the pleading is
sham and false. This preliminary remedy must be obtained
before proceeding as though the pleading had not been filed.
Thus, although the unsigned answer was voidable, it could not
be ignored for purposes of the notice requirement of CR 55.01
so long as it remained in the record.
D. Compulsory Counterclaims
In Powell v. The Winchester Bank,5 ' the issue 57 was
whether the plaintiff was estopped from bringing a suit to set
aside a deed by which he conveyed property to his father while
under a decree of incompetency. The father had subsequently
transferred the property to others, who were purchasers with-
out notice. The estoppel allegedly arose due to plaintiffs fail-
13 280 S.W.2d 495 (Ky. 1955).
,m Id. at 498.
,' 350 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1961).
" 551 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. App. 1977).




ure to assert this cause of action in a previous suit. After the
father's death, a suit was brought by the executor seeking an
interpretation of the will of the decedent. By this time, plaintiff
had been legally restored to competency and was named as a
party to that suit, as were the other heirs. In that suit, plaintiff
was held to be the lifetime beneficiary of a trust, with the
principal to be distributed to the remaindermen upon his
death. Following this judgment, plaintiff then filed suit to set
aside the deed executed by him in favor of his father during his
period of incompetency. On this set of facts, the court of ap-
peals ruled that under CR 12.02, he should have pleaded the
deed contest as a defense to the suit to construe the will and
was therefore barred by the principle of collateral estoppel from
asserting it in this subsequent suit.
CR 12.02, which requires "every defense, in law or fact, to
a claim for relief in any pleading" to be asserted in a responsive
pleading, does not appear to be applicable here. A cause of
action to declare a deed null and void does not have the "ring"
of defense to an action to construe a will. If it was required to
be asserted, then it should have been categorized as a compul-
sory counterclaim under CR 13.01. A suit to construe a will is
in the nature of a declaratory judgment"'8 and there is authority
to the effect that the compulsory counterclaim rule applies in
declaratory actions. 59 The problem then becomes whether a
deed contest "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter"'6 0 of the earlier suit to construe the will.
In Pipeliners Local Union No. 798 v. Ellerd,"1' the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the following test for deter-
mining whether two actions arise out of the same transaction
or occurrence: (1) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the
claim and counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res judi-
cata bar a subsequent suit on the defendant's claim if not
asserted?6 ' (3) Will substantially the same evidence support or
'' KRS § 418.040 (1972).
"' Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Trotter, 130 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1942); Crosley
Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925 (3d Cir. 1941); cf. Harris v. Wallace, 474 S.W.2d
878 (Ky. 1971) (declaratory judgment conclusive on the issues decided therein). See
CLAY, KENTUCKY PRACTICE 234-35, Civil Rule 13.01, Comment 6 (3d ed. 1974).
IKO Ky. R. Civ. P. 13.01.
III 503 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1974).
112 Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suif
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refute plaintiff's claim as well as defendant's counterclaim? (4)
Is there any logical relationship between the two claims?1 1 3 The
court noted that the "logical relation" factor is the most con-
trolling.
In declaring Powell's suit barred by collateral estoppel, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals relied on Newman v. Newman"0 4
and Hays v. Sturgil' 5 for the controlling rule:
The iule is elementary that when a matter is in litigation,
parties are required to bring forward their whole case; and
'the plea of res judicata applies not only to the points upon
which the court was required by the parties to form an opin-
ion and pronounce judgment, but to every point which pro-
perly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the
parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought
forward at the time.'166
Newman was a case in which a subsequent suit for adverse
possession was held not barred by a previous judgment on a
suit to construe a deed to the same land, but apparently only
because the adverse possession had not ripened at the time of
the first suit. However, in Hays, it was held that a subsequent
suit to have a deed annulled on the ground of mental incapac-
ity of the grantor was not barred by a previous judgment
construing the deed with respect to the title it conveyed. Since
the court in Powell relied on the rule in Hays, why is Hays not
controlling? Is a judgment construing a deed not more closely
related to a suit to set aside the same deed than a judgment
construing a will would be to a suit to set aside a deed, even
though the proceeds from the sale are a part of the estate?
Because the executor of an estate administers only per-
sonal property, there is some authority for the proposition that
in an action in equity for the construction of a will, questions
involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same cause
of action, whereas under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, such judgment precludes
litigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of
whether it was based on the same cause of action as the second suit. Cream Top
Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1967).
162 503 F.2d at 1198, citing 6 WoGr AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 1410, at 42 (1971).
114 451 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. 1970).
,, 193 S.W.2d 648 (Ky. 1946).




relating to the legal title to estates in land may not be raised.17
If such were the rule, then the suit to set aside the deed would
not be even a permissive counterclaim,'68 much less a compul-
sory counterclaim which would give rise to collateral estoppel.
This may explain the court's determination to characterize the
suit as an action in fraud rather than an action for the recovery
of real property.'69
The rationale of the Powell decision is that the plaintiff's
father had long since sold the property in question and the
funds from this sale were a part of the estate in the hands of
the executor some six years later when suit was filed to construe
the will. The result of that suit was that the plaintiff was found
to have a life estate in the form of a trust, to which he would
be entitled to the income, but the principal would ultimately
go to the remaindermen. Stripped to the bare bones, the suit
to set aside the deed was nothing more than an attempt by the
plaintiff to obtain an absolute interest in so much of the princi-
pal of the trust as it would take to reimburse him for his inter-
est in the real estate; thus his interest in the estate's funds
would increase to the detriment of the remaindermen. Viewed
in this manner, the case may well be seen as one appropriate
for the application of CR 13.01 and the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.
VI. DIscoVERY
In Nowicke v. Central Bank and Trust Co.,' 7° a default
judgment was entered against the appellant because of his fail-
ure on two occasions to appear for discovery depositions, first
pursuant to a notice served by appellee, then pursuant to an
agreed order. 1 71 The defendant alleged illness as the cause of his
failure to appear on both occasions, but he filed neither an
affidavit nor a medical statement in support of these claims.
The purpose of the liberal discovery procedures contained
in the civil rules reflects the philosophy that the purpose of
pleadings is to give notice, not detailed allegations of facts, and
,6 See 80 Am. JuR.2d Wills § 1501, n. 11 (1975).
"' Ky. R. Civ. P. 13.02.
,6' See notes 2-11 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of this point.
170 551 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. App. 1977).
,7, Ky. R. Civ. P. 37.04(1); 37.02(2)(C).
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the development of facts should be accomplished through the
discovery procedures provided in Rules 26 through 37172 CR
30.01 provides for the taking of the deposition of a party, and
no subpoena is required to compel his attendance, since the
notice to take a deposition is sufficient for that purpose.
173
Certainly, granting a default judgment as a penalty for
failing to appear for a deposition seems harsh.174 However, a
flagrant disregard of discovery requirements would justify such
a result.1 75 There was no counterpart to CR 30.01 under the civil
code and a subpoena was required to compel a deposition by a
party. In one case under code practice, the defendants were
held in contempt of court for failing to testify by deposition
pursuant to a subpoena. 176 Nowicke is the first case under the
new rules where a default judgment was entered for failure to
submit to depositions, but default judgments have been sus-
tained where a party failed to answer interrogatories 17 1 and
where a party failed to produce records pursuant to a subpoena
duces tecum. 78 The only other case involving failure of a party
to appear for deposition which has been decided since the
adoption of the civil rules is Armstrong v. Biggs.179 In that case,
the Court of Appeals overruled a default judgment where only
three days' notice was given by plaintiffs of their intention to
take depositions in Paducah, Kentucky, of three defendants
who lived in other states. This was held not to be "reasonable
notice," and certainly no one could quarrel with that ruling.
However, in Armstrong, the defendants did file what amounted
to a motion for a protective order 80 accompanied by a support-
ing affidavit.
The circumstances surrounding the defendant's failure to
appear at two scheduled depositions in the Nowicke case
hardly seem to qualify as a "flagrant disregard of discovery
" 6 CLAY, KENTUCKY PRATICE 231, Civil Rule 26.02, Comment 3 (3d ed. 1974).
,73 Armstrong v. Biggs, 275 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Ky. 1955).
,7, Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
", In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641 (1974).
,T, Kindt v. Murphy, 227 S.W.2d 895 (1950).
I'7 Ky. R. Civ. P. 33.01; Benjamin v. Near East Rug Co., 535 S.W.2d 848 (Ky.
1976); Naive v. Jones, 353 S.W.2d 365 (Ky. 1961).
" McHargue v. Perkins, 295 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. 1956). See Ky. R. Civ. P. 34.01.
,71 275 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. 1955).
I" Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.03.
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requirements.""8 ' The first deposition was scheduled on Janu-
ary 24, 1974, and the second one on February 26, 1974. The
default judgment was entered on February 27, 1974. Although
appellant might have avoided this predicament had he filed an
affidavit or a medical statement in support of his assertions of
illness, the swiftness with which the default was obtained indi-
cates he hardly had time to support his assertion before the ax
fell. Armstrong v. Biggs"2 had held that a party's statements
explaining the reasons for his failure to comply with an order
of discovery must be accepted as true in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary. Of course, the explanations in
Armstrong were presented by affidavit, and a bare unverified
assertion generally is thought to be insufficient.8 3 In Nowicke,
however, the court did not rely on the unverified nature of the
appellant's claims of illness, but sustained the trial court's
findings on the basis of a "pattern of contumacy."' 84 It was said
that this pattern was established by the fact that it took a year
aftbr suit was filed to locate and serve appellant with process
(though the court's opinion contains no allegation that he was
deliberately avoiding service and, if there was such evidence,
that appellee availed himself of the appropriate remedy)' 5 and
that appellant's original attorney had filed a motion to with-
draw accompanied by an affidavit stating that he had received
little cooperation from the appellant. The court also stated that
appellant had refused to be responsive (although this motion
was filed six days after the default judgment was entered).
However, appellant did have ample opportunity to file affida-
vits in support of his motion to set aside the default judgment'8 '
and it is presumed he failed to file them even at that late date
although this fact is not stated in the court's opinion.
8I Nowicke v. Central Bank and Trust Co., 551 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Ky. App. 1977).
182 275 S.W.2d 60 (Ky. 1955).
"I Cf., Department of Highways v. Ginsburg, 516 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Ky. 1974)
(statements made by appellant, in a motion for a new trial, that the trial court commit-
ted prejudicial error by refusing to permit a juror to be challenged for cause after it
was disclosed on voir dire that she had been a defendant in a recent condemnation suit
involving the same project; Court of Appeals refused to consider such allegations
because they were not supported by an affidavit).
184 551 S.W.2d at 811.
" In such a situation "the clerk shall . ..make an order on the complaint
warning the party to appear and defend the action within 50 days." Ky. R. Civ. P. 4.05.




A. The Right to Trial by Jury
In Whitfield v. Cornelius, 87 the action was to recover on a
promissory note and the counterclaim was for money wrong-
fully taken. The defendant's demand for a jury trial was denied
and this was held on appeal to be reversible error.
The result should not have been unexpected. An action on
a promissory note is an action on a debt and is triable by jury
if proper demand is made.181 So is an action for conversion of
money.'89 While it has been held in some cases that certain
issues, though legal in nature, are too complicated for consider-
ation by a jury,"' it was noted in Whitfield that the trial court
had no basis for such a finding in this case (and, in fact, did
not even pretend to state a basis). The court of appeals pointed
out that the trial court's assertion "that it is 'impractical for a
jury intelligently to try the case' is not sufficient.""' While
there are some legal scholars who question the competency of
a jury to try any issue,"2 one suspects that the individual liti-
gant, given a choice, would rather trust his fate to a jury of his
peers than to the lawyers and judges-and the law clearly pro-
tects his choice in that regard."3
B. Motion for a Directed Verdict
In Barnett v. Stewart Lumber Co., 4 the action was for the
balance due on the purchase of a saw mill. Appellant was
brought in by a third-party complaint,"' claiming he had con-
tracted with defendant for the purchase of his interest in the
saw mill and thereby had assumed the debt owing to the plain-
554 S.W.2d 870 (Ky. App. 1977) (discretionary review granted Sept. 13, 1977).
' Brock v. Farmer, 291 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1956).
, Shatz v. American Surety Co. of N.Y., 295 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1955).
3, See, e.g., Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 500 (Ky.
1975); McGuire v. Hammond, 405 S.W.2d 191 (Ky. 1966); see also Ky. R. Civ. P. 39.01.
"' 554 S.W.2d at 871. But see.Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531
S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1975) wherein the Supreme Court made virtually the same observa-
tion in a case of a type which traditionally had been triable by jury.
",2 See, e.g., Richardson, Trial Juries and the New Rules-Right to Trial by Jury,
47 Ky. L.J. 185, 192 (1959).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Ky. CONST. § 7; Ky. R. Crv. P. 38.01.
" 547 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. App. 1977).
", See Ky. R. Civ. P. 14.01.
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tiff. Although the opinion does not quote from the answer to the
third-party complaint, it can be assumed that this allegation
was denied, since the case went to trial on that issue. In fact,
the court directed a verdict on the contract in favor of the
original plaintiff against the original defendant and then di-
rected a verdict in favor of the defendant/third-party plaintiff
against the appellant. Finally, the trial court "directed a ver-
dict as a matter of law on the agreement between [the original
defendant] and the appellants to pay the debt owing the
[original plaintiff in favor of the original defendant]." '' This
portion of the opinion is quoted verbatim because there is some
indication elsewhere in the opinion that the trial court actually
may not have directed a verdict against this particular appel-
lant on that issue, but rather against his brother, who had also
appealed on another issue.
On appeal, it was claimed that the trial court erred in
failing to sustain appellant's motion for a directed verdict on
the grounds that he had nothing to do with the transaction for
purchase of the saw mill from the original defendant. The court
of appeals summarily dismissed this argument, holding that he
did not allege this fact as ground for a directed verdict when
he made his motion at the trial level.
CR 50.01 specifically states, "A motion for a directed ver-
dict shall state the specific grounds therefor." It has been held
that the purpose of the rule "is to apprise fairly the trial judge
as to the movant's position and also to afford opposing counsel
an opportunity to argue each ground before the judge makes his
ruling."' 97 However, where both the judge and opposing counsel
obviously know the grounds relied on in the motion, the pur-
pose of the rule has been met and there would seem to be no
need to reiterate these grounds with the chance of running
afoul of CR 50.01.111 Where the primary issue raised in the
pleadings is the presence or absence of a valid contract between
the parties, it is unduly harsh to hold that an appellant has
failed to preserve an alleged error for review by failing to ap-
prise the trial court in his motion for a directed verdict that his
grounds therefor are that he was not a party to the agreement.
", 547 S.W.2d at 789.
,, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Vance, 431 S.W.2d 864 (Ky. 1968).
"' Hercules Powder Co. v. Hicks, 453 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1970).
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This is particularly so in this case where the trial court ruled
on the basis of somebody's argument that the appellant, as a
matter of law, was a party to the agreement!
C. Repeating Testimony After Jury Deliberations Have
Begun
In Holcomb v. City of Louisville, 99 the jury returned to the
courtroom during deliberations and advised the court that it
could not reach a verdict unless certain testimony was reread.
Unfortunately, neither the court reporter nor her notes or tapes
could be located. The trial judge directed the jury to resume
deliberations "as if he had denied the request but subject to the
fact that he might reconsider if it became feasible to do so,"
i.e., if the court reporter reappeared. A Kentucky statute seems
to make such a rereading mandatory upon the request of the
jury,"' and on appeal it was held to be reversible error to force
the jury to continue deliberation without the requested infor-
mation. The statute provides that:
After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be a disa-
greement between them as to any part of the testimony, or if
they desire to be informed as to any point of law arising in
the case, they may request the officer to conduct them into
court, where the information required shall be given in the
presence of, or after notice to, the parties or their counsel.",
The court of appeals cited Little v. Whitehouse"' as au-
thority for reversing the Holcomb case. In Little, the jury had
requested permission to take a doctor's deposition into the jury
room. This clearly is not allowed." 3 The ruling on appeal in
Little was that in such a circumstance, the trial judge should
have asked the jury whether there was disagreement regarding
the doctor's testimony and should have informed them that
parts of the deposition could be reread to them to the extent
necessary to resolve the disagreement.0 4 The Holcomb court
- S.W.2d - (Ky. App. 1977).
,' KRS § 29.304 (1971).
20 Id. (emphasis added).
202 384 S.W.2d 503 (Ky. 1964).
" Louisville, Henderson & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 62 S.W. 736 (Ky. 1901).
" 384 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Ky. 1964).
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also cited Smith v. Wright,"5 but that case dealt with the re-
reading of certain testimony where there was disagreement be-
tween the attorneys during closing arguments.
Authority from other jurisdictions is scarce and what can
be found is conflicting. The closest case is the California case
of Asplund v. Driskell,0 8 which contained virtually the same
facts as Holcomb regarding the disappearance of the court re-
porter, but the jury took the judge off the hook by electing to
abandon its request for the rereading of the testimony. How-
ever, it has been held in Oklahoma criminal cases that a stat-
ute substantially similar to Kentucky's 27 is not mandatory in
its language and that it is within the discretion of the trial court
whether requested testimony is to be reread after deliberations
have begun." 8 The interpretation given these statutes seems to
depend on whether the mandatory predicate "shall be given"
pertains to "the information required" or "in the presence of,
or after notice to, the parties or their counsel" 29 or both. The
interpretation given by the Kentucky court that the "informa-
tion required" shall be given appears more logical than the
Oklahoma interpretation. In long or complicated cases, it is
unreasonable to expect the jury to remember or to be in
agreement among themselves on all of the testimony heard
during the trial. If the jury feels it cannot properly decide the
case without refreshing its recollection on crucial testimony,
then the principles of justice and fairness would seem to de-
mand that it be reread to them.
512 S.W.2d 943 (Ky. 1974).
na 37 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Cal. App. 1964).
2" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 894 (West)(1958). This statute actually employs the
language "must be given" instead of the Kentucky language "shall be given."
21 Kovash v. State, 519 P.2d 517 (Okla. 1974), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 830 (1974);
Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1969).
21 The court in Jones v. State, 456 P.2d 610 (Okla. 1969) gave the following
interpretation of the Oklahoma statute:
We interpret the mandatory aspect of 22 O.S.A. § 894 to be that which
provides for the return of the jury to the courtroom, and for the notification
of the parties to the trial that the jury is being returned for additional
information or instruction. The termination (sic) of whether or not the jury's





A. Finality of the Order
In Johnson v. Smith,210 plaintiff brought his suit against
three defendants and an order was entered on May 23, 1975,
dismissing as to one defendant for lack of jurisdiction.2 1, The
original order recited that it was a "final and appealable
order," but these words were deleted in a modified order pur-
suant to a motion timely filed. The order became final on May
21, 1976, when the case was settled between the plaintiff and
the other two defendants. When the plaintiff then appealed the
granting of the summary judgment, it was claimed the appeal
was not timely filed. This argument was summarily dismissed
by the court of appeals:
CR 54.02 states that where there are multiple parties in-
volved in a suit and an order is entered granting a final judg-
ment as to one or more but less than all the parties, the
judgment must recite that it is final and that there is no just
reason for delay. If the order does not recite this then it is not
final and appealable and is therefore subject to modification
at any time before entry of the judgment adjudicating all the
claims . 12
The reader may think this ruling is so elementary as not
to be worthy of comment. Certainly, there are numerous cases
holding that an order entered in a multiple party or multiple
claims suit is not final and appealable unless the CR 54.02
recitals are contained in the order.2 13 Further, the order must
contain both recitals; a statement that the order is "final"
without the accompanying statement that "there is no just
reason for delay," will not suffice to make the order appeala-
ble.214 Although it has been held that the mere inclusion of the
CR 54.02 recitals will not make an order final and appealable
when the order prima facie indicates that it was not intended
210 551 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. App. 1977).
2'1 See note 114 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of this aspect of the
case.
212 551 S.W.2d at 835 (emphasis added).
222 See, e.g., Department of Highways v. General Refractories Corp., 453 S.W.2d
531 (Ky. 1969); Linkous v. Darch, 299 S.W.2d 120 (Ky. 1957).
214 Peters v. Board of Educ., 378 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. 1964).
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to be a final adjudication of the rights of the parties,1 5 it would
seem to be well settled that no order in a multiple parties or
multiple claims suit is appealable without strict compliance
with CR 54.02. If so, then why is the issue so often raised? The
case discussed next provides the answer.
In Cerwin v. Taub,211 suit was brought to foreclose a mort-
gage on the Mayflower Hotel in Louisville. A restaurant tenant
of the hotel was also a party and receivers were appointed for
both the hotel and the tenant. A default was taken against the
mortgagor and the appellants were the successful bidders at
the sale of the mortgaged property. Upon their failure to com-
ply with the terms of the sale, an order was entered on Novem-
ber 17, 1972, which provided in pertinent part that the confir-
mation of the first sale would be set aside and the property
resold "for the account of and at the risk of the original pur-
chasers. ' 217 The only bidder at the subsequent sale was the
plaintiff mortgagee and the purchase price was $245,000 less
than appellants' successful bid at the first sale. The second sale
was confirmed without objection on August 10, 1973. Neither
the order of November 17, 1972, nor the order of confirmation
of August 10, 1973, contained the recital that the order was
final and that there was no just reason for delay. 18 It was not
until July 23, 1976, that the order was entered declaring "that
the November 20, 1972, order was a final order within the
meaning of CR 54.01 at the time of its entry and that this July
23, 1976, order was a final order, appealable and that there was
no just reason for delay in its entry. ' 219 On appeal, it was held
that the November 20, 1972, order was final and appealable
and that, therefore, the 1976 appeal was not timely filed.
CR 54.01 provides that an order or judgment is final and
appealable only when it adjudicates all the rights of all the
parties in an action or proceeding, or when it is a judgment
made final under CR 54.02. As discussed earlier, an order en-
tered in a multiple claims or multiple parties action does not
become final and appealable unless it contains the CR 54.02
21S Hale v. Deaton, 528 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1975).
2,' 552 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. App. 1977).
217 Id. at 677.
21 These recitals are required by Ky. R. Civ. P. 54.02(1).
219 552 S.W.2d at 677.
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recitals; without the recitals the order is merely interlocutory
and no appeal can be taken until a subsequent order is entered
finally disposing of all claims.
To reach the ultimate result in Cerwin, the court of ap-
peals first had to find that the receivers for the hotel and the
tenant restaurant owners were not parties to the suit when-the
November 20, 1972, order was entered. In doing so, it cited two
old cases in which a receiver was described as "an indifferent
person between the parties; an officer of the court appointed
on behalf of all parties . . . the creature, and arm, of the
court. '"2 However, those were cases in which the issue was
whether the plaintiff should be liable for the fees of the receiver
to the extent there were insufficient assets in the receivership
to pay for them. In fact, a more likely interpretation of those
two cases is that the receivers are separate parties and, there-
fore, payment of their fees is not the responsibility of other
parties. Certainly, one must question the rationale that the
appointment of a receiver for a party somehow transforms that
party into a "nonparty." Professor Moore recognized the confu-
sion that Federal Rule 54(b) (which is identical to CR 54.02)
would cause in cases involving receiverships. He drew a distinc-
tion between a plenary action brought against a receiver and a
receivership action. He wrote that in a plenary action, there is
no special problem because "if it involves multiple claims or
parties, then amended 54(b) applies.""22 There is no indication
that he would consider a party for whom a receiver has been
appointed in such a case to be a "nonparty." In a receivership
action in which a receiver is appointed, Professor Moore did see
problems.
[T]he amended Rule will be applicable to many, probably
most, receivership proceedings for these will usually involve
multiple claims for relief, as well as multiple parties; some
final orders will probably deal with collateral matters and
their appealability will not be affected by the amended Rule,
but what is a collateral matter proves troublesome at times;
apart from adjudications dealing with collateral matters,
some adjudications will certainly involve a 'claim for relief',
221 Id. at 678, citing Atlantic Trust Co. v. Chapman, 208 U.S. 360 (1908), and
Crump & Field v. First National Bank of Pikeville, 17 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. 1929).
"1 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACNCE 154.39 at 661 (2d ed. 1976).
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or will fully dispose of the interest of one or more but fewer
than all the parties, and, absent a certificate by the district
court, such an adjudication will lack finality under the
amended Rule until all of the action has been adjudicated. 
2
Cerwin was obviously a plenary action and it should make
no difference that the defendants were placed in receivership
after the action was filed rather than before. The bankruptcy
of the defendants did not make them nonparties. At best, it
only meant that some, but not necessarily all, of the claims
against them were uncollectable.
By finding the receivers to be nonparties, the court did not
reach the question whether the order for payment of the defi-
ciency could be interpreted as a collateral matter and thus
subject to the "collateral order doctrine" enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.23 On the other hand, since the order of November
20, 1972, was entered on motion of the original plaintiff "to
resell the property for the account of and at the risk of the
appellants,' '"2 4 a reasonable argument could be made that the
request constituted a separate claim for relief by the plaintiff
and thus was not subject to the Cohen rule.2
Another issue in Cerwin was whether there were multiple
claims. As previously stated, the bankruptcy of the defendants
did not extinguish all the claims against them; it merely made
some of them uncollectable. Further, if the claim for the defi-
ciency is viewed as a separate claim from the original suit in
foreclosure filed against the hotel and tenant, then there are
both multiple parties and multiple claims. Appellant raised
the point that the claims of other lienholders, which were filed
against the receivers, created a multiple claims situation. The
court pointed out that these lienholders were not parties to the
2 Id. at 662-63.
- 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The collateral order doctrine excepts from the final judg-
ment rule orders "which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collat-
eral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too inde-
pendent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the
whole case is adjudicated." Id. at 546.
224 552 S.W.2d at 677.
115 Cf. United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Stein, 410 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1969) (order granting
partial summary judgment instructing indemnitors to deposit a sum of money as
collateral in favor of a surety on a performance bond held not to fall under the collateral
order doctrine because it was one of the claims for relief sought in the action).
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action and their claims merely awaited apportionment from
the ultimate proceeds of the sale; thus they were not claims
within the meaning of CR 54.02.26 Although the court cited no
authority for this proposition, there seems to be some support
for it in Webster County Soil Conservation District v.
Shelton,27 where the question of the amount of an attorney's
fee was held open and it was argued that this created a CR
54.02 multiple claims situation. The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals held that the attorney was not a party and had not made
a motion for a fee as of the date of the judgment, so there was
no multiple claims situation. To the contrary, however, is the
old case of Harris v. Tuttle,2 8 where an appeal from an order
of sale was held premature because the order established the
priority of some liens, but not all, and therefore did not finally
determine the manner of distribution. The "other creditors"
referred to in that case were apparently in the same position
before the Court as were the lienholders in Cerwin.
The reader's attention is also called to the case of Calvert
Fire Insurance Co. v. Stafford,"'9 where an order adjudicating
the rights of the plaintiff as to one defendant was held to be
final and appealable even though there were other defendants.
The plaintiff's complaint had failed to state a claim for relief
against the other defendants, but only joined them as parties
demanding that they be required to assert whatever interests
or claims they might have, and they asserted none. The result
caused no undue hardship in that case because the issue was
whether the appeal was premature, not whether it was too late.
Assuming the court was correct when it found in Cerwin
v. Taub20 that there were no multiple parties and no multiple
claims, was it also correct in finding that the order of Novem-
ber 20, 1972, was a final order under CR 54.01? The court cited
Elam v. Acme Well Drilling Co. 2 1 and Sickmeier v. Merchants
& Mechanics Loan & Building Association of Newport232 to
support its holding that the order directing the resale and pay-
22 552 S.W.2d at 678.
1 437 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1969).
62 S..W. 729 (Ky. 1901).
-1 437 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1969).
552 S.W.2d 675 (Ky. App. 1977).
-1 411 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1967).
2 163 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1942).
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ment by appellant of the deficiency, if any, was the final order
contemplated by CR 54.01. Actually, Elam involved an order
for satisfaction of judgment by a surety who had posted a bond
at the outset of an action to prevent attachment. Sickmeier is
more on point and, indeed, indicates that the order of sale in
that case was final and appealable. It should be noted, how-
ever, that an order confirming the sale was subsequently en-
tered and the appeal was filed within the time allowed, regard-
less of which order was really the "final" one. There are other
cases not mentioned in the opinion which hold that an order
of sale, which also directs the distribution of proceeds, is a final
and appealable order.2 33 However, it was held in Harris v.
Tuttle234 that an order of sale is not final where it contains no
provision for distribution of the proceeds. Since the claims of
outstanding lienholders had not been resolved and since the
proceeds of the sale would be subject to those liens, the order
did not provide for final distribution and thus was not final and
appealable.
Directly contrary to the point of view expressed in Cerwin
is the federal position as set forth by the United States Su-
preme Court in 1876 in Butterfield v. Usher:25
The decree [ordering resale] ... simply set aside one
sale that had been made, and ordered another. A decree con-
firming the sale would have been final. But this decree is
analagous to a judgment of reversal with directions for a new
trial or a new hearing, which, as has often been held, is not
final.
We do not wish to be understood as holding that a pur-
chaser at a sale under a decree in equity may not, at a proper
stage of the case, appeal from a decree affecting his interests.
All we do decide is, that there cannot be such an appeal to
this court until the proceedings for the sale under the original
decree are ended.B
This rule was restated and specifically followed by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals as recently as 1975 in Levin
2 Newsom v. Johnson, 255 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1953); Hearn v. Lander, 74 Ky. (11
Bush) 669 (1876).
2 62 S.W. 729 (Ky. 1901).
2n 91 U.S. 246 (1876).
213 Id. at 248-49.
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v. Baum.3 That court pointed out that another reason for the
Butterfield rule is that the previous bidder might also be the
successful bidder at a second sale. That was an unlikely result
in Cerwin, but the same reasoning would apply to the possibil-
ity that the second sale would result in no deficiency at all and,
therefore, no appeal would be needed. Though not specifically
citing Butterfield, the Kentucky Court of Appeals had seemed
to adopt the Butterfield rule in the 1951 case of Massey v.
Fischer.38 There it was held that the final act which consum-
mates a judicial sale is the order of confirmation, and an appeal
taken from an order overruling exceptions to the commis-
sioner's report of sale was dismissed as premature. The only
way to reconcile Massey with Sickmeier 9 is to view the lan-
guage in Sickmeier as dicta. Of course, since Massey is a more
recent case, its holding should be viewed as the applicable
precedent.
As if all of the above is not confusing enough, Kentucky's
highest court held in another case24 decided prior to Massey
that "it is a settled rule in this State that a judgment decreeing
a sale and the order confirming the report of sale are separate
and distinct adjudications and that the latter may be sepa-
rately appealed from and set aside." '41 Does that mean that
both orders are final and appealable?
Of course, whether the "final" order in Cerwin was the
order of sale or the order confirming the report of sale was a
moot issue, since a timely appeal was taken from neither order.
However, for the court of appeals to declare the order of sale
as the final order in this case is to put an unreasonable burden
on other parties in the same position as the appellant in
Cerwin. Until the report of sale has been confirmed, the party
liable for the deficiency does not know whether he has been
harmed. An appeal from the order of November 20, 1972, would
have had to have been filed before the sale even took place.
Further, under the Butterfield rule, implicitly adopted by Ken-
513 F.2d 94 (7th Cir. 1975).
243 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1951).
22 Sickmeier v. Merchants & Mechanics Loan & Bldg. Ass'n of Newport, 163
S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1942).
20 Hunter v. Hunt, 178 S.W.2d 609 (1944).
2, Id. at 612.
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tucky in Massey v. Fischer,242 the appellant in Cerwin could
well have expected an appeal from the order of resale to be
summarily dismissed as premature.
The law books are replete with cases involving dismissal
of premature appeals.2 13 Many or most of those cases are not
cases in which the lawyer just had a "hankering" to file an
appeal; they were cases in which the lawyer was afraid not to
appeal because he did not know whether the case was final and
appealable and would rather file the appeal and be dismissed
to return another day than take a chance on being finally dis-
missed for filing too late. The court of appeals has not helped
the confusion in this situation. By finding that: (1) certain
original parties became "nonparties" when placed in receiver-
ship, (2) a motion to enter an order requiring payment of a
deficiency did not assert a separate claim, (3) claims of other
lienholders to the proceeds of sale did not constitute separate
claims, and (4) an appeal should be taken from an order of sale
instead of an order confirming the report of sale, the court of
appeals has ensured that it will continue to be inundated with
unnecessary appeals. Lawyers are understandably more inter-
ested in protecting their malpractice insurance carriers than in
worrying about whether an appeal might be premature and
thus detrimental to judicial economy.
The court of appeals had an easier time with Cobb v.
Carpenter.244 In that case, the appellants .not only failed to
appeal from the order of sale, but also failed to appeal from
either the order filing the report of sale or the order of final
distribution of proceeds. Instead, they filed a motion for an
extension of time under CR 73.02(1)(b) 245 and then appealed
242 243 S.W.2d 889 (Ky. 1951).
212 See 2 Ky. DIGEST, Appeal and Error, keys 79 (1) and (2), and 80 (1) through
(6).
2)4 553 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. App. 1977).
241 Under Ky. R. Civ. P. 73.02(1)(a) the time period in which the notice of appeal
must be filed is 20 days (30 days before July 1, 1976) following the date on which the
judgment or order appealed from was entered. However, Ky. R. Civ. P. 73.02(1)(b)
provides:
Upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of a party to
learn of the entry of the judgment or an order which affects the running of
the time for taking an appeal, the trial court in any action may extend the




from the court's denial of that motion. The motion was not
made within the then required thirty days of the last possible
appealable order, i.e. the order of final distribution. As the
court noted, the appeal was filed "within 30 days of an order,
but one that is not a final order under CR 54.01 and therefore,
not appealable. '"2 Certainly, no one could seriously argue with
this conclusion.1
47
B. Sufficiency of Notice of Appeal
Prior to July 1, 1976, CR 73.03 provided in pertinent part
as follows: "The notice of appeal shall specify the parties tak-
ing the appeal, and shall designate the judgment or part
thereof appealed from." As amended effective July 1, 1976, CR
73.03 now provides: "The notice of appeal shall specify all the
appellants and all the appellees; 'et al.' and 'etc.' are not pro-
per designations of parties." In Yocom v. Franklin County Fis-
cal Court, ?A the court of appeals noted that the first readable
copies of the amendments were contained in the August 10,
1976, advance sheets to the Southwestern Reporter and that
seminars on the new amendments were not conducted until
October 1976. Citing the exception contained in CR 86(2) deal-
ing with situations in which an injustice would result from
application of the new rules to a pending action, the court gave
the members of the bar until January 1, 1977, to review and
familiarize themselves with the new amendments to the rules.
Thereafter, strict compliance would be required. As of July 1,
1977, the court has issued the following interpretations of the
amendment:
(1) When the caption to the notice of appeal specified the
defendants as "Franklin County Fiscal Court, et al.," it was
held to be a sufficient designation since the other defendants
were the county judge and the magistrates and they were all
sued in their official, rather than individual, capacities. 49
248 553 S.W.2d at 293.
27 Ky. R. Civ. P. 73.02(1)(a); Rose Bowl Lanes, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 373
S.W.2d 157 (Ky. 1963); cf., Frantz, Inc. v. Blue Grass Hams, Inc., 520 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.
1975) (order denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict not a final order
and not appealable); cf. also Hawks v. Wilbert, 355 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. 1961) (order
denying motion for new trial not a final order and not appealable).
2 545 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. App. 1976).
24 Yocom v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 545 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Ky. App. 1976).
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(2) A designation of the appellees as "Southeast
Jefferson-Southwest Shelby Water District, et al." was not suf-
ficient to take an appeal against the subscribers to the water
district, who had been joined as a class as indispensable par-
ties, or the chairman of the water district, who had also been
named an original party defendant.
2
1
(3) Where the caption identified all parties to the action,
but designated them "plaintiff' and "defendants," the body of
the notice of appeal (stating that the defendants (named) were
taking the appeal without stating who was the appellee) was
sufficient to designate the appellee; since the plaintiff was the
only other party involved in the action except the appellants,
she must have been the appellee.
25
(4) Even where the body of the notice of appeal did not
designate who the appellees were and where two other parties
could so qualify, the notice of appeal still was sufficient to take
an appeal against both other parties since both were specifi-
cally named in the caption, even though they were not desig-
nated in the caption as "appellees.
' '252
(5) Where the body of the notice of appeal did not specify
who the appellees were, and where the caption to the notice
listed one party other than the appellant, but designated the
others by use of the designation "et al.," the notice was suffi-
cient to take an appeal against the party specifically named in
the caption, but was insufficient to take an appeal against any
other parties.
25 3
It was noted by the court that the notice of appeal is suffi-
cient if it is possible to determine who is entitled to prosecute
a cross-appeal under CR 74.24 It was also noted that Form 22
of the Appendix to the Rules of Civil Procedure does not require
that the appellees be specifically named in the-body of the
notice of appeal. CR 84 indicates that use of these forms is
sufficient compliance with .the rule. Thus it would seem that
the court is going to be as liberal as possible in interpreting this
250 G. Reynolds Watkins, Consulting Engineers, Inc. v. Southeast Jefferson-
Southwest Shelby Water Dist., 545 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Ky. App. 1976).
2' Schulz v. Chadwell, 548 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. App. 1977).
2 O'Brien v. Peterson, 548 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. App. 1977).
2" Pearlman v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Louisville, 548 S.W.2d 181, 183,
184 (Ky. App. 1977).
211 Yocom v. Franklin County Fiscal Court, 545 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Ky. App. 1977).
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new rule, but if an appeal against a particular party is desired,
specific mention of that party's name somewhere in the notice
of appeal should be sufficient for compliance with the new rule.
C. Designation of the Record
In Beaver v. Beaver,?5 appellant failed to file his designa-
tion of record within ten days of the filing of the notice of
appeal, as required by CR 75.01. A motion to dismiss the ap-
peal for failure to designate the record was filed in the trial
court forty-eight days after the filing of the notice of appeal.
On the same date, appellant belatedly filed his designation of
record. The motion to dismiss the appeal was overruled by the
trial court.
Strict compliance with CR 75.01 has been required in the
past.26 However, it has been held that a court may grant an
enlargement of the time for filing a designation of record under
CR 6.02 even though the motion for enlargement is made after
the expiration of the required ten days.2 7 The motion for en-
largement must precede an appropriate motion to dismiss.255
Yet, no motion for enlargement was made in the Beaver case,
so the motion to dismiss should have been sustained.
However, the designation of record is not a jurisdictional
matter29 and therefore is not appropriate for review on the
court's own motion. The rule is for the benefit of the appellee
and may be waived.26° Although the appellee in Beaver filed a
timely motion to dismiss in circuit court, it was held on appeal
that her failure to file a separate appeal from this order, or to
file a separate motion to dismiss before the court of appeals,
constituted a waiver of her right to rely on this error. There is
authority to support this ruling.261 This author strongly agrees
that appeals should be decided on their merits whenever possi-
ble and that the court should avoid dismissing cases on the
grounds of failure to follow procedural technicalities. However,
25 551 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. App. 1977).
"' Timmons v. Allen, 449 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1969).
211 Montfort v. Archer, 447 S.W.2d 143 (Ky. 1970).
= Id.
21 Bardill v. Bird Well Surveys, Inc., 310 S.W.2d 265 (Ky. 1958); Timmons v.
Allen, 449 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Ky. 1969).
10 Elam v. Acme Well Drilling Co., 411 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1967).
21, Pipelines, Inc. v. Muhlenburg County Water Dist., 465 S.W.2d 927 (Ky. 1971).
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is the court not merely turning the technicality against the
party who would otherwise be entitled to assert it by requiring
her either to (1) file the same motion twice in the same record,
or (2) take a separate appeal from an order denying her motion
to dismiss the opposing party's appeal in the same case? So
much for judicial economy.
D. The Record on Appeal
In light of the liberal approach to the rules taken by the
court of appeals in Beaver, consider the plight of the appellant
in Department of Transportation v. Greer Brothers & Young,
Inc.2 The appellant obtained an extension of time in which to
file the record on appeal, but the circuit clerk failed to note the
order on the civil docket. Thus, the order had no effect. 163 How-
ever, the failure of the clerk to note the order on the civil docket
was discovered on the fifty-eighth day after the filing of the
notice of appeal, which was two days before the expiration of
time for filing the record on appeal. 64 Instead of merely re-
questing the, clerk to correct the error and note the entry of the
order on the civil docket, appellant inexplicably filed a motion
requesting the trial court to enter an order nunc pro tunc re-
quiring the clerk to note the order on the civil docket as of the
date it was first delivered to the clerk's office. Incredibly, this
motion was overruled and the order overruling the motion for
entry nunc pro tunc was entered after the time for filing the
record on appeal had expired! A motion to dismiss for failure
to file the record timely was filed by the appellee after the
motion for entry nunc pro tunc was filed, but before the order
overruling the motion was entered.
265
One can only wonder why appellant did not simply direct
the clerk to correct the error, since the error was discovered
before the time for filing the record on appeal had expired. For
262 548 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. App. 1977).
2S1 Ky. R. Civ. P. 58; Murrell v. City of Hurstbourne Acres, 401 S.W.2d 60 (Ky.
1966).
21 Ky. R. Civ. P. 73.08 requires the record on appeal to be filed with the appellate
court within 60 days after the filing of the notice of appeal.
2" The court had delayed entering the order overruling the appellant's motion so
that appellant miglit apply to the court of appeals for appropriate relief. Appellant
must have wondered to what relief he was entitled, since CR 73.08 vests with the trial
court the discretion to extend the time for filing the record on appeal.
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that matter, no direction was necessary, since the clerk should
have noted the order on the civil docket as soon as the previous
failure to do so had been brought to his attention."' There is
some authority for the proposition that it is the litigant's duty
to insure that the clerk performs the ministerial functions nec-
essary to the proper prosecution of the litigant's case, 6' but
what more can a litigant do than call the error to the clerk's
attention? The author declines to speculate on the trial judge's
reasons for refusing to sustain the motion to enter the order
nunc pro tunc, but it would appear under this set of facts to
be an obvious abuse of the discretion granted him under CR
73.08. After all, he already had previously granted the motion
for extension of time in the same case. Certainly, there is noth-
ing in the record to indicate that appellant would not have been
able to file the record on appeal within the time limit, as en-
larged.
However, the appeal was not taken from the order overrul-
ing the motion for an order nunc pro tunc and the court of
appeals designated that as a final appealable order under CR
54.01. The court likened the motion for an order nunc pro tunc
to a motion to set aside a judgment under CR 60.02.66 Thus,
the case was before the court only on the issue of whether the
record on appeal was timely filed-and it obviously was not.
E. Damages on Appeal
In Cobb v. Carpenter,269 appellants' land was sold pur-
suant to a court order for purposes of satisfying unpaid prop-
erty taxes. Appellants managed to hold on to their property
during the pendency of the appeal, although there was some
question whether a supersedeas bond had been issued. The
court of appeals noted in its opinion that "the reading of the
entire record would indicate to this court the appeal may be
one of delay only, '20 since the land included a 6,000 pound
tobacco base. On appeal, the court assessed as damages not
only the costs of the appeal, but also the fair and reasonable
211 See Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1973).
297 Jackson v. Jones, 336 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1960).
211 See White v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 307 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1957).
2. 553 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. App. 1977).
"I Id. at 293.
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rent of the property during the time the appellees were kept
out of possession. 7' The court stated it was assuming a super-
sedeas bond had been filed. However, it went further: "If it is
true that a supersedeas bond has not been executed, then the
cost and damages above are to be deducted from the amount
presently held by the circuit clerk for distribution to the appel-
lants. 27 2
This imposition of damages on appeal even in the absence
of a supersedeas bond is totally without precedent in this juris-
diction.273 KRS § 21.130 had provided for a ten percent penalty
on affirmance of a money judgment. This statute had been held
mandatory and the imposition of the penalty was not discre-
tionary.274 However, that statute was repealed in a bill passed
by the General Assembly on March 23, 1976,275 and replaced by
KRS § 26A.010.2
76
The notice of appeal in Cobb v. Carpenter was filed on
May 25, 1976, two days after the effective date of repeal of KRS
§ 21.130. Section (1) of the new statute, KRS § 26A.010, pre-
cludes the assessment of any damages on appeal in this case,
21 See Ky. R. Civ. P. 73.04(3); Moss v. Smith, 361 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1962).
212 553 S.W.2d at 293.
273 There are other jurisdictions which do allow a reviewing court to assess a
penalty or damages on a finding that the appeal was taken frivolously or for the
purpose of hindering or delaying justice. See 5 AM. JuR.2d, Appeal and Error § 1024
(1962) and cases cited therein.
271 Preece v. Bums' Adm'r, 87 S.W.2d 375 (Ky. 1935).
'" 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 67, § 14; 1976 Ky. Acts. ch. 59, § 3.
276 KRS § 26A.010 (1976) provides:
(1) When collection of a judgment for the payment of money has been
stayed as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure, there shall be no damages
assessed on the first appeal as a matter of right contemplated by section 115
of the Constitution of Kentucky.
(2) When collection of a judgment for the payment of money has been
stayed as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure pending any other appeal,
damages of ten per cent (10%) on the amount stayed shall be imposed
against the appellant in the event the judgment is affirmed or the appeal is
dismissed after having been docketed in an appellate court.
(3) Similar damages of ten per cent (10%) shall be imposed when a petition
for writ of certiorari, petition for rehearing, or other'petition which stays
collection of a judgment for the payment of money is denied by an appellate
court under circumstahces not constituting a first appeal under subsection
(1) of this section.
(4) No additional penalty shall be imposed upon a party as a consequence
of a review subsequent to a petition or a second appeal.
(5) Damages imposed under subsections (2) or (3) of this section shall not
be payable and shall be void if the decision of the trial court awarding the
payment of money is ultimately reversed.
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regardless of the court's opinion concerning the motives of the
appellants. If no supersedeas bond had been filed, then appel-
lees' remedy was to execute on the judgment.277 If there was a
supersedeas, the court's ruling was directly contrary to the
statute.
CONCLUSION
Commissioner Clay believed in strict compliance with the
procedural rules because proper use of the rules fosters expe-
diency and judicial economy. 8 He was amazed that lawyers
ignore the rule book and "sometimes seem to assume that once
in court, the settled processes of law and a sympathetic judge
will take care of their cases for them."' 9 As the cases discussed
in this article show, the ultimate result cannot always be antic-
ipated by consultation with the rule book. Certainly, while no
attorney should rely on a "sympathetic judge" to keep his case
in court, neither should he have to fear that his otherwise meri-
torious claim will be thrown out of court by a narrow and some-
times convoluted construction of the rules and laws of proce-
dure. A far more important policy than the policy of expe-
diency and judicial economy is the policy that every litigant
shall have his day in court. The rules should be construed with
this policy in mind.
m KRS § 426.260 (Supp. 1976).
" Clay, The Use and Abuse of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 Ky. L.J. 161, 162-
63 (1959).
21' Id. at 162.
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